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Public Comment 
 
Draft Report, ICCA/Queen Mary Task Force on Third Party Funding 
in International Arbitration 
 
 
Reforming International Investment Law: 
Opportunities, Challenges, Paradigms 
 
Panel Two, “TPF and ISDS” 
 
October 25, 2017 
 
A Conference Jointly Sponsored by the Boston College Law School 
and the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile 
 
Chair: Professor Frank J. Garcia, Dean’s Global Fund Scholar, Boston College Law 
School, and Member, Board of Editors, Oxford Journal of International Economic Law 
 
Panelists:  
Mr. Leo Gargne, MA, Sorbonne Law School; LLM Candidate and Fellow, Law & Justice 
Program, Boston College Law School  
Prof. Dr. Eric de Brabandere, Professor of Dispute Settlement Law, Leiden University Law 
Faculty; Editor in Chief, Leiden Journal of International Law  
Ms. Rachel Thrasher, JD, MA, Research Fellow, Pardee Center, Boston University  
Prof. William “Rusty” Park, Co-Chair, ICCA/Queen Mary Task Force; Professor, Boston 
University Law School 
 
Opening Comment by the Chair: 
 
Although TPF (which we can define loosely as dispute funding structured as an investment by 
non-parties) has only recently been on the upswing and was for a long time illegal in most 
common law and civil law jurisdictions, it has already generated a lot of interest and 
controversy in its short but meteoric rise.  
 
Today we have the opportunity not only to consider and evaluate the Task Force Report as a 
response to both the opportunities and risks of TPF, but also to consider TPF itself in the 
larger context of the future of international investment law: what role does it play, and what 
role should it play, if we look at investment law from a fairness and governance perspective? 
 
Comment by Mr. Leo Gargne: As stated by the E15 Task Force on Investment Policy 
launched by ICTSD (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development), the 
‘current ISDS system conceptually suffers from a tension between its public governance 
functions and its set-up as a private dispute settlement mechanism that is modelled on how 
private-private disputes are settled in commercial arbitration.”  
 
Despite mentioning, and describing in part, the larger debate over the legitimacy of the 
investment arbitration regime, it seems like the Task Force, in Chapter 8 of its Draft Report, 
did not address TPF as what is it, that is, evidence of a larger asymmetry that exist within 
investment arbitration under the current regime. There is a growing consensus about the need 
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for reform with regard to ISDS. Indeed, it is primordial to insure that states have enough 
policy space and have enough control over the system. Past disputes in investor-state 
arbitration reflect how the balance has tilted in favour of investors, even though there exist 
legitimate governmental concerns and social values at stake. The effect and impact that TPF 
has within the investor-state dispute settlement system is only another illustration of the 
misalignment described by the E15 Task Force. 
 
Indeed, it appears that TPF, despite its advantages in commercial arbitration or domestic 
litigation, might play a negative role in this legitimacy crisis within the ISDS framework as it 
tilts further still the balance in favour of the investor. The impact of third-party funding is 
certainly different in a system where one party, the respondent state, which acts as a sovereign 
entity, is accountable towards its citizens and its government. In that respect it is worth noting 
that even though in principle third-party funding is also available to respondent states, 
because funders are profit-driven entities and because states cannot bring counterclaims in 
investment arbitration, funding states is much less appealing to third-party funders. Further, it 
might be tricky for the state to justify itself to its constituents as to why it has to pay the third-
party funder a return for an uplift even though it won. But more importantly, a funded state 
would have to give up some of its control over the management the case and the arbitration 
strategy.  
 
TPF is often seen as granting greater access to justice to impecunious or risk adverse 
claimants. The logical result of this is that it allows for a higher volume of cases to be brought 
before arbitral panels. While this would be something to be pleased with if all additional 
proceedings brought because of TPF were meritorious, nothing is less certain.  
 
It is important to note that, given that most third-party funders are profit-driven entities, they 
have no interest in the substantive issues presented before the arbitral panel. Consequently, 
they are more likely to invest in claims having the potential for high volume awards. And 
indeed, there is no empirical evidence that small investors compared to big companies benefit 
from this form of financing. The Task Force seems to simply accept the argument of access to 
justice, just like the fact that TPF is here to stay. However, it seems important to question 
even this premise. Is recourse to third-party funding a necessity or a mere corporate finance 
decision? Who is really requesting third-party funding today, small investors or big 
companies? Indeed, other means of recourse are available. It appears that getting specific 
information about the nature of cases third-party funders finance is tricky, as third-party 
funders are the only ones holding this kind of information. 
 
Moreover, the assertion that third-party funding does not bring more frivolous claims because 
of the due diligence and screening process funders go through before financing a claim seems 
to only partially reflect economic reality. In fact, funders usually adopt the same business 
model as insurance companies and often form a portfolio of cases, enabling the funder to 
adopt a more speculative attitude and undertake “risk diversification strategies”.  
 
On the other hand, there is a very real potential for an increase in the number of international 
investment arbitration cases that could have a very significant and negative impact on states, 
and developing states more specifically. The damages awarded in investor-state disputes are 
colossal. Further, even if the claim or claims are rejected, the reputation of the host state as a 
favourable jurisdiction for foreign investment might be tarnished. But more importantly, there 
is no general rule on how the costs of the proceedings should be allocated. Therefore, even if 
the state wins, it might have to pay for the costs it incurred to defend itself. If the American 
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rule applies, or even the German rule to some extent, the state will have to bear some of these 
costs. 
 
This deterrent effect makes a further asymmetry in a system where the state is always 
defendant and cannot take counter-claims. This entails that the funder always gets paid from 
responder states. In essence, states are the sole payers of TPF investment arbitration. Another 
problem—states’ money comes through tax revenue. Allowing third parties to have an effect 
on this is problematic. Therefore, there is a serious risk that TPF will pose a significant 
burden on states and affect regulation. Once again, this reflects a larger problem—the existing 
asymmetry in investment treaties.  
 
Funders are not parties to the investment arbitration strictly speaking, but by offering 
financing they gain control and economic power over the claim. They can therefore influence 
the management of the case and ultimately the outcome of the dispute between the investor 
and the respondent state. In that respect, an issue that was only briefly touched in the Report 
is that TPF might modify the law by bringing more marginal cases with new issues, which is a 
different issue than that of frivolous claims. This is illustrated by the fact that, however 
infrequently, it may be that some third-party funders have engaged in not-for-profit financing. 
One of the reasons motivating funders to finance such cases is the hope to create a favorable 
precedent that would favor them in future disputes. The case Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A. 
et al. v. The Russian Federation, under the SCC, is a good example of that. In this context, is 
the State’s development a factor in the third-party funders’ selection process? The same 
question arises when considering the State’s experience and expertise in defending itself 
against investor’s claims. 
 
In conclusion, investor-state arbitration was not designed to help big multinational companies 
challenge states for trying to implement legitimate, non-discriminatory measures adopted in 
good faith and regarding tax, the environment, labor laws, or even human rights. Some 
players have taken advantage of these systemic deficiencies within the ISDS framework. 
There is a troubling lack of obligations on the investor’s end in the system today. And even if 
the legal standards contained in most BITs have been applied differently depending on the 
arbitral panel, we can see a general trend emerge, which is that of very liberal, expansive, and 
pro-investor interpretations of the legal standards set out in investment treaties.  
 
There is certainly a need for a reform that would bring back international investment 
arbitration to its roots, which have more in common with public law litigation than purely 
private commercial litigation. It is, therefore, paramount that some form of regulation limiting 
the number of funded cases be adopted.  
 
Comment by Prof. Dr. Eric de Brabandere: I will focus on the question of disclosure of 
TPF agreements, and talk briefly on transparency. 
 
It’s true that we have seen an increase in the use of TPF. We’ve also seen an increase in 
attempts to try to regulate it. There is a tendency for the EU Commission to be against TPF, 
but at the same time they want to open up arbitration to small and medium enterprises (since 
it is currently hard for them to engage without outside finding).  Perhaps for this reason the 
Commission is keen on including it in new international negotiations, though I’m not sure if 
the regulation they proposed is the best—you have to disclose TPF, but there is no sanction to 
non-disclosure. 
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It’s generally very difficult to regulate TPF, to come up with a sound regulation, with one 
exception, disclosure. 
 
Opponents worry that disclosure adds costs, extends the time of arbitration, etc. However, 
recent cases support the idea that you can no longer keep it completely secret. There is a 
general tendency toward transparency, but the principle alone is not enough to justify full 
disclosure of TPF, though there are tribunals that have ordered disclosure of TPF. We need 
something more, which is what I will discuss now. 
 
If you have rules of impartiality that you apply towards counsel of claimants, why not apply 
the same principle to TPF? This of course implies that TPF parties have some control over the 
arbitration. That’s not always very clear when you talk to TPF funders, but in practice it 
affects choice of counsel and arbitrator, the strategy, etc. 
 
Disclosure is necessary in investment arbitration because of certain specific features.  There 
are similar applicable laws, awards are usually made public, and it is therefore easy to identify 
the particular vision of an arbitrator on a particular issue, either through majority or dissenting 
opinions. It’s important that you have a strict impartiality and avoid conflict of interest. 
 
This is why issue conflicts—individuals acting as counsel and arbitrator in a different cases—
poses a distinct problem in investment arbitration. As to repeat appointments of arbitration, 
appointed three times by the same party, that is a situation that will put you on the orange list 
in the IBA Guidelines on conflicts of interest. 
 
This is a matter of principle, and many tribunals have accepted this. The IBA 2014 Guidelines 
also have followed this and expanded the definition of third party to include funders. Also, 
many tribunals if they are aware (and this is the difficult part, knowledge) request disclosure 
of both existence of agreement and identification of third party. 
 
It should be noted that what is targeted by the standards, is appearance of bias and not actual 
bias. It has been argued by TPF proponents that if you don’t know there is a funder you can 
never have a conflict.  Practically this may make sense, but it is flawed as a principle.  We are 
not talking about whether the arbitrator has been appointed by the same state or if the 
arbitrator actually is biased, because the standard tackles the appearance of bias, not actual 
bias.  And just because you keep TPF a secret, it does not mean that you avoid a later conflict.   
 
My final point concerns the potential negative effects of TPF. There are more and more 
requests for security for costs by the other party, when they know that the claim has received 
funding. Again, there is the perception that funding is only sought by claimants in dire need of 
funding, but this is not always true. Still, there’s a tendency of states requesting security for 
costs, and in fact granted in one specific case, RSM v. St. Lucia. The dissenting opinion by 
Gavan Griffith said you should always order security for costs. Since then, many states 
involved in investment arbitration have made a request for security for costs. 
 
Can they do this? Of course. Should they do it? That’s another question. I have no strong 
view. It’s a combination of various issues, and depends on specific reputation of other party, 
what’s at stake. The mere presence of TPF is not in my view a reason alone to request 
security. 
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Comment by Ms. Rachel Thrasher:  
 
This is an attempt at a framework for understanding third party funding. In particular, 
regarding the Chair’s question of fairness, what are we looking for in terms of reform: 
“Justice for whom?” 
 
Since this has been covered somewhat in the previous two presentations, I won’t discuss the 
origins of TPF in too much detail. TPF beginnings are found in domestic litigation, with an 
upsurge in international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration during the financial 
crisis. This may be due to several factors, one being corporations and investors experiencing 
economic difficulty yet wanting to pursue meritorious claims. Another factor may be 
investors seeking alternative capital outlets, where the returns would not be correlated to 
traditional markets. 
 
TPS proponents have several main arguments. One is “access to justice”— that people would 
have their claims decided before an impartial tribunal. Two is availability for both “sides”—
it’s an argument for fairness, that this creates opportunity for everyone. Three is that TPF 
promotes disinterested, dispassionate and highly detailed assessment of claims, and that 
funders are even better in this way than attorneys. Four is that TPF is just like other types of 
funding—it should be treated the same. Five, related to four, is that it has wide use in 
domestic courts and international commercial arbitration, so it’s a legitimate way to fund 
cases in general. 
 
First, let me address “Access to Justice.” The quintessential complainant for purposes of third 
party funding in general is the impecunious individual or corporation who simply does not 
have the money to bring a case – largely because of the wrong-doing of the prospective 
defendant. The norm in international arbitration today is the growing corporate utilization of 
TPF by large, well-resourced entities looking to reduce risk or take the cost of arbitration off 
of their balance sheets. We’re simply not looking at the impecunious client. Other evidence 
against the importance of TPF for “access to justice” is that there are other funding 
availabilities, which I’ll discuss shortly, which suggest that clients in need of money have 
other alternatives for funding their cases. Given the availability of other funding alternatives 
and the possibility of litigation in domestic courts, there are other options. TPF may not be 
holding together “access to justice.” 
 
Second, Equal Use. Again, the evidence shows that use of TPF is unequal. The argument that 
TPF is available to states as well as investor-claimants is supported by some anecdotal 
evidence only. There are only two cases of states receiving TPF. One, we’ve heard about 
several times this morning – Philip Morris vs. Uruguay (where public health considerations 
were an issue which mobilized civil society to provide support), and RSM Production 
Corporation vs. Grenada (where the funder had a political interest in the State prevailing).  
 
TPF is highly asymmetric, essentially throwing a bunch of additional funding toward one side 
of an already unbalanced system. Proponents of TPF also argue that portfolio funding could 
be used to fund defendant cases—by not always having to have high return cases, you can 
free up funding for more types of clients. But that’s not the way portfolio funding has been 
used in general. Portfolio funding is in place to handle high risk/high reward cases balanced 
against low-risk/low reward cases, not pro-bono funding or low-return defense cases. There is 
also the concern that state money is taxpayer money, so if the state made an agreement with a 
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funder, in which the funder received a return on the outcome of the case, it’s possible that this 
is outside the legal power of states to provide given their role as a sovereign state. 
 
Third, Disinterested and Dispassionate Assessment. Funders have argued that it’s simply bad 
business to fund cases without merit. Actually, quoting Mick Smith, co-founder of Calunius 
Capital, which is a funder in the US dispute market, “The perception that you need strong 
merits is wrong—there’s a price for everything.” Funders are constantly seeking out 
innovations to fund all types of cases. Furthermore, the interconnectedness of the TPF 
community is well established. Its members acknowledge the web of attorneys, arbitrators, 
and funders working together. This information is acknowledged in the Task Force report. 
Without desiring to or needing to impute bad faith, this creates incentives to increase the 
number of cases and perpetuate the system, which speaks against the claim that it is 
disinterested. 
 
Fourth is Alternative Funding Opportunities. TPF is functionally similar to corporate/equity 
financing, insurance, and contingency fee arrangements. They each similarly offer non-
recourse funding with the promise of a return in the event the funded party prevails. But they 
also each differ in important ways. Corporate and equity financing is when a corporation 
funds a case for a subsidiary or branch of the corporation.  This is like TPF, but the funder is 
related to the complainant.  The issue of conflicts of interest that could come up in TPF is not 
as much of an issue here because those corporate relationships are already disclosed. For 
insurance, the key difference with TPF is that insurance is offered at a much lower cost to the 
funded party.  And there is not a day-to-day financing for things that come up, but a payout at 
the end. Contingency fee arrangements, like corporate equity financing, are immediately 
discoverable, so there is no issue of secrecy that could create conflict of interest. 
 
There is also the uniqueness of investment arbitration—the role of states as sovereign entities 
that have special status, as opposed to private entities in commercial arbitration. I won’t spend 
more time on this as it has been covered extensively already, but as I and others have 
mentioned earlier, only investors can initiate disputes, giving them almost sole access to TPF. 
There are a lot of unknowns about the impact and future uses of TPF, and who ultimately 
benefits from TPF. We clearly do not have adequate information. In light of this, I argue that 
we need expansive disclosure of TPF arrangements. This is important for three reasons: to 
avoid conflicts of interest, to address general transparency concerns, and to provide data for 
long-term research. First, on disclosure, this was covered well by Eric so I won’t go into the 
details. Briefly, there is general agreement that the existence and identity of third party 
funders should be disclosed to avoid conflicts of interest. The only question is, who should 
disclose it: the arbitrators or the funded party?  There is also a larger-scale interest in 
disclosure, not just in the identity of TPFs, but also in key provisions of the funding 
agreement. 
 
We have an institutional interest in transparency. For one, the trend is already toward more 
transparency, not less. This is evidenced by the 2006 modification to the ICSID Arbitration 
Rule and 2013 Transparency Rules in UNCITRAL. Transparency is about the legitimacy of 
the system as a whole, so we ought to seek it in all areas.  
 
Second, and this is a repeated theme, so much is still unknown about TPF in international 
investment arbitration. Proponents speculate that TPF will promote greater and much needed 
investment in developing countries. Critics say it will drain state balance sheets and lead to a 
regulatory chill. However, until we have data, we cannot know the truth of either statement. 
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And in order to gather this data, we need to know not only the existence and identity of third 
party funders, but also the general structure of these funding agreements, and the financial 
situation of the funded party, in order to make better decisions for the long run. 
 
Finally, the fact that Third-Party funding is currently accepted in the realm of international 
investment arbitration, and the fact that critics calling for it to be banned have been unable to 
“move the needle” in terms of making practical changes, as some experts have said, is no 
reason for us to assume that TPF will remain with us forever. International investor-state 
dispute settlement has been an established institution for more than 50 years. We now know 
where reform is needed and that’s why we’re here today – to push for that reform. If we said 
that the current system is here to stay, we would be giving up. The same is true for TPF. For 
now we need to regulate with a long-term view to pushing the envelope further where the 
evidence suggests that we ought to. We should welcome ongoing scrutiny that will bring 
greater justice, transparency and consistency. And greater disclosure can make this possible. 
 
 
Comment by Prof. Rusty Park:  
 
Those who know French history or have read Shakespeare know that the 25th of October is 
the anniversary of a famous battle in the One Hundred Years’ War: 1415, the Battle of 
Agincourt, made famous in Henry V. In that play, in one famous scene, the English are about 
to go into battle with the French, and Earl of Westmoreland says to Henry V, “Sir we are 
few,” and Henry answers, “We few, we happy few.” The king is happy because it means more 
honor for each of those soldiers. They won the battle but lost the war 15 years later. 
 
This phrase “We few, we happy few” comes to mind for investor-state arbitration. There are 
very few people who are honestly interested in discussing the merits of the subject. It has 
become a political football, somewhat of a Rorschach text: what you see tells you a lot about 
who you are. People who look at IS funding tend to see things in it related to a particular 
political perspective, just as people do who look at arbitration in a domestic context. 
Yesterday, the US Senate voted 51-50 for a measure to limit class actions in the US. Liberal 
papers like the Times came out against the vote. But if you were to take the arguments made 
by liberals, arguments in favor of class action, but substitute the word TPF for class action, 
because that’s what they are, you would get the same argument but left and right would be 
reversed.  
 
With that general comment, let me go into the devil in the details. There are three musketeers 
of TPF regulation. (Actually, there are four musketeers). First is disclosure, which was dealt 
with by previous speakers. Most reject the notion that what you don’t know can’t hurt you. 
Second, costs. There are two issues here: one is whether there can be an order for security of 
costs, another whether costs can be reimbursed at the end. The general rule outside the US is 
that the loser pays. Can the loser be required to pay the winner’s TPF costs? Another issue 
being discussed is whether a tribunal can order one party to make a disclosure of TPF. This 
came up in a recent case where a state was ordered to disclose its TPF, which led to a 
challenge that was rejected. The third musketeer is privilege. People often don’t talk about 
privilege for TPF, but Anglo-American lawyers know only the common interest privilege, 
where there’s no waiver of privilege because documents are exchanged between the two 
parties. This is an unexplored area, the question of TPF and the common interest privilege. 
Outside the US and England, privilege does not have the same connotation. Continental 
countries have professional secrecy, meaning the lawyer cannot make a disclosure, but there 
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is no privilege attaching to a particular document. The fourth musketeer relates to so-called 
best practices. There are lots of people writing about best practices in TPF. My own tendency 
is to avoid the word “best practices.” In fact, there is a lot of leeway in international 
arbitration for best practices. There might be bad practices, or good practices, but it’s hard to 
say that there is a “best” practice.  
 
Those who are interested in the Task Force itself should address questions and comments to 
Catherine Rogers and Stavros Brekoulakis at the Queen Mary Law School in London. Those 
two co-chairs have taken on themselves the lion’s share of the work. And I think that 
probably at this point this is what the Chair wanted me to say, so I should probably sit down 
for questions.  
 
 
Q&A: 
 
Question (Prof. Sonia Rolland, Northeastern Law School): If the investor is a publicly traded 
company, is third party funding not already disclosed somewhere in securities documents for 
shareholders? That is not a substitute for a more centralized debate on this, but does the issue 
of disclosure become less serious to some extent if that information can be uncovered? 
 
Answer (Eric de Brabandere): This is why in several cases claimants make an official 
statement confirming they have third party funding.  In other cases, you can find it in 
documents but claimants are not explicit. But, it is not always easy to find this stuff out and 
you do have to go and look for it. Note though that small and medium enterprises are less 
explicit about third party funding and are much more careful about being open about outside 
funding. 
 
Question (audience member): Are there cases where third party funding brought about issues 
of bias or conflict of interest? 
 
Answer (William Park): If I understand your question, you’re asking are there instances 
where disclosure has resulted in finding that one of the arbitrators is biased. There are cases 
where the issue has been raised, though to my knowledge there are no cases where 
disqualification has occurred. 
 
Question (Prof. Elizabeth Trujillo, Texas A&M Law School): Regarding best practices, why 
is this not a good way to regulate third party funding? This seems to be the way regulation is 
going in trade and investment, taking into consideration input from the private sector, etc. 
 
Answer (William Park): It isn’t so much that it’s wrong to have good and bad practices set 
out. What’s objectionable is to say that one particular practice is the best, and anything that is 
not the best is bad. For instance, on the issue of privilege, there is a huge difference in the 
Anglo and Continental context. Anglo lawyers who write about best practices may forget that 
half of the rest of the world does it differently, and that professional secrecy requires a 
different approach. No doubt there are some bad practices and some good practices; my 
allergy to the term “best” is an allergy to people who believe they know best for everyone in 
the world, instead of many acceptable practices. 
 
Follow-up question (Trujillo): Is there a common practice evolving? 
 
 9 
Answer (William Park): Certainly. One is disclosure. Certainly there is a bad odor to 
arbitration if it’s found that the same law firm is supplying one person to chair the tribunal 
and another to advise the third party funder. But things are not so simple. We talk about the 
independence of arbitrators, but there are some systems where the arbitrator is not expected to 
be independent. The narrow community of insurance arbitration in London has a very 
different view of best practices than in the US or France.  
 
Question (Prof. Sergio Puig, University of Arizona Law School): Do you see potential 
harmonization given that some arbitral institutions have admitted that one of the advantages is 
that they reflect different practices and flexibility? 
 
Answer (Eric de Brabandere): There is a lot of competition and they are very careful in 
adopting regulations to this effect. This is why I’m skeptical generally about regulations, as 
it’s very difficult to imagine a situation where they will be generally acceptable. This 
competition will probably only increase. I don’t see how you can have all institutions agree on 
what are best practices, they all have very different interests.  
 
Question (Chair): Let me build on that to propose a question to the panel. We’ve been talking 
about a range of techniques that are not new to law: disclosure, best practices, conflict of 
interest rules, etc. There are different ways to understand the deployment of these tools. One 
would be to assume that, if we have insufficient knowledge, we are not in the best position to 
make new rules, so let’s develop a way to get that knowledge in the meantime through 
disclosure, etc.. Another way to understand their deployment is that we use best practices and 
disclosure because we believe these are the right tools. A third approach might see using these 
techniques as distracting us from the key structural issues. So these are just three different 
ways these issues can be talked about.  I’d like to ask the panelists to each comment on this. 
 
Answer (Leo Gargne): From an academic point of view, there is a difference between 
international commercial arbitration and international investment arbitration. In commercial 
arbitration, reform within the system through regulation that’s not too strong, like in 
Singapore and Hong Kong, can be helpful. For investment arbitration, it’s more systemic, and 
a more general reform is needed to tackle third party funding and the ISDS system and its 
legitimacy issue. 
 
Answer (Rachel Thrasher): I think that it’s useful to use these strategies to create information 
that we can act on later. Because we lack information, it’s not clear how to address the 
situation. I also think that when I approach this, I see some real fundamental difficulties with 
the way that investment treaties and dispute settlement and third party funding are set up in a 
really asymmetric way. It’s possible that by talking too much about the ways to mitigate 
immediate problems, we are distracting from a larger discussion. So I think that’s a real 
danger. 
 
Answer (Eric de Brabandere): I don’t have much to add, but it depends on who you talk to. 
International law professors think it’s outrageous that someone would finance a claim against 
a state. If you are looking at the things you can actually regulate, then you look to things like 
disclosure. Or else you can consider what is in the treaties themselves. 
 
Answer (William Park): One of the points Rachel and others made is that we need to have 
information before we come up with any good versus bad practices. Another is to be aware of 
our own positions. Someone who is writing a manual on good practices will have presumed 
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his or her conclusion ahead of time. I mentioned that what is always impressive is how few 
people look at IS in a dispassionate way. They start out by thinking it’s either good or bad. 
Right now, the chief spokespeople for both sides think it is bad. Trump did this at the UN, 
Elizabeth Warren said something similar. Unaccountability is a bad thing. But accountability 
to whom, the claimant or the respondent? Often people cite the 1872 Alabama arbitration as 
the beginning of international arbitration, between the US and Britain after the Civil War. The 
decision addressed Britain’s allegedly allowing ships to be built in Liverpool that then served 
the Confederacy to attack the North’s commercial vessels. Britain had to pay a huge sum. 
This is often taken as a paradigm of international arbitration as a peacemaking mechanism, 
and it did probably prevent the US from invading Canada—this is what Senator Charles 
Sumner threatened. But when you look at what the arbitrators were actually doing, Charles 
Francis Adams from US, for example, they were taking instructions from their governments. 
That’s not international arbitration as we know it today. It wasn’t a best practice, but it was 
better than the alternative, which would have been war. So getting back to good and best 
practices, we have to remember that things are evolving, and hopefully those who are crafting 
good and bad practices will start without a conclusion. 
 
Follow-up question (Frank J. Garcia) (directed toward William Park): I’m not asking you to 
breach any confidentiality, but one can’t help notice that the chapter at the end of the draft 
report on third party funding reads stylistically very differently than the others, because (as it 
mentions) there was strong division over what that recommendation should look like. Are the 
different opinions we just covered also present on the task force itself? 
 
Answer (William Park): There was strong division. 
 
Question (audience member): China is interested in developing its own third party funding 
mechanisms as part of its growing commitment to arbitration, do you have any 
recommendations for us?  
 
Answer (William Park): Feel free to share my contact information and I’d be happy to send 
them the report.   
 
The Chair brought the session to a close at 12:30pm Wednesday October 25, 2017. 
 
